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Melting in the Hands of the Court 
M&M’S, ART, AND A PRISONER’S  
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, Donny Johnson pled guilty to second degree 
murder for the death of John Viveiros and was sentenced to 
fifteen years to life imprisonment.1 Nearly a decade later, 
Johnson was sentenced to two more terms of nine years to life 
for stabbing one prison guard and assaulting another.2 He is 
currently an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) in 
California.3 Johnson is held in the prison’s Security Housing 
Unit (“SHU”), its highest-level security cell, where he is in 
solitary confinement for what will likely be the rest of his life.4  
For all his solitude, Johnson has been in the public eye 
of late. While in the SHU, Johnson painted postcards by using 
his own hair, foil, and plastic to make paintbrushes and 
leeching M&M’s for paint.5 Johnson sent his postcards to a 
  
 1 Adam Liptak, Behind Bars, He Turns M&M’s into an Art Form, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2006 [hereinafter Liptak, Behind Bars], available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/us/21artist.html?_r-l&oref. Johnson and two friends 
were involved in the murder, which took place at a San Jose party. Id. An argument 
over the sale of PCP-laced cigarettes led to the fatal stabbing. Id. Johnson was only 
twenty years old at the time of his second-degree murder plea. Id. 
 2 Id. At trial, Johnson claimed he acted in self-defense and that he believed a 
gang member attacked him. Id.  
 3 Id. The maximum-security prison sits on 275 acres of Northern California 
territory. According to its website, PBSP holds the state’s “most serious criminal 
offenders in a secure, safe, and disciplined institutional setting.” The prison currently 
houses 3461 inmates, with a staff of 1548. California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation: Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Visitors/ 
Facilities/PBSP.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2007). 
 4 Liptak, Behind Bars, supra note 1. Roughly half of PBSP’s inmates are 
held in the SHU. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, supra note 
3. The SHU’s inmates present “serious management concerns,” and include “prison 
gang members and violent maximum security inmates.” Id. 
 5 Liptak, Behind Bars, supra note 1; Kim Curtis, Prison Artist Faces 
Disciplinary Hearing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 4, 2002, available at 
http://www.pelicanbayprisonproject.org/features/htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2007). 
Johnson’s biography appears on Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia; the biography 
focuses primarily on his art, its exhibit and donation to charity. See Donny Johnson, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donny_Johnson (last visited Sept. 8, 2007). He is described 
 
812 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
“pen-pal,” psychoanalyst Stephen Kurtz.6 Impressed by the art, 
Kurtz displayed the postcards in a Mexican gallery in the 
summer of 2006.7 The exhibition drew at least 500 people, and 
approximately twenty postcards sold for $500 each.8 
The success of Johnson’s gallery, however, did not 
impress everyone. In response to a New York Times article on 
Johnson’s art and the gallery, prison officials disciplined 
Johnson for engaging in “unauthorized business dealings” by 
banning him from mailing his postcards.9 Such a regulation, if 
challenged before the Supreme Court, is likely to withstand 
judicial scrutiny. The Court has consistently upheld prison 
regulations as constitutional.10 The First Amendment in 
particular is not absolute and is subject to certain restrictions 
when the speaker is an inmate.11 From limitations on family 
visits to magazines, the Court gives great deference to prison 
administrators.12  
In doing so, however, the Court may help a state 
achieve an otherwise unattainable legislative goal. For 
example, virtually all states and the federal government have 
enacted laws that limit a criminal’s right to profit from 
expressions of his crime.13 Anti-profit legislation, commonly 
  
as “an American painter . . . known for his unconventional technique, which involves 
using a paint brush made out of his own hair and paint pigment from M&M’s dissolved 
in water.” Id. A description of his crimes is limited to two sentences. Id. 
 6 Curtis, supra note 5. Kurtz runs the Pelican Bay Prison Project, a non-
profit organization—“completely independent of and hav[ing] no connection” to 
California’s Department of Corrections—that is “dedicated to the men incarcerated at 
[PBSP].” Pelican Bay Prison Project, http://www.pelicanbayprisonproject.org (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2007); see also Kim Curtis, Prison Artist in Hot Water: Officials Say He 
Broke Rules with M&M Creations Sold for Charity, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2006, at 2. 
 7 Curtis, supra note 5. 
 8 Id.  
 9 Adam Liptak, Prison Disciplines Publicized Inmate who Makes Art Using 
M&Ms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Liptak, Prison Disciplines 
Publicized Inmate]. Under California’s Code of Regulations, inmates cannot “actively 
engage in a business or profession” unless it is authorized by the head of the 
institution. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3024(a) (1995). The provision defines “business” 
as “any revenue generating or profit making activity.” Id. Prison officials can reject an 
inmate’s mail if it “relates to the direction of an inmate’s business or profession.” Id. 
§ 3024(b). 
 10 See infra Part III.A.  
 11 See infra Part I.  
 12 See infra Part III. 
 13 New York enacted its first Son-of-Sam Law in 1977. Michelle G. Lewis 
Liebeskind, Back to Basics for Victims: Striking Son of Sam Laws in Favor of an 
Amended Restitutionary Scheme, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (1994). Nearly every state 
and the federal government adopted some form of anti-profit legislation. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3681 (2006); ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (LexisNexis 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 
(2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (2006); 
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referred to as Son-of-Sam laws, have met constitutional 
challenges during the past fifteen years with little success for 
states.14 The standard for withstanding constitutional muster is 
high—the law must be “narrowly tailored,” says the Court, to a 
compelling government interest.15  
Nevertheless, by virtue of judicial deference, a prison 
regulation may accomplish the same goal that an imperfect, 
constitutionally defective state law cannot. Thus, judicial 
deference can render the state’s imperfect criminal anti-profit 
law irrelevant. This Note argues that recent Supreme Court 
decisions that defer to state prison administrators unfairly 
curtail prisoners’ First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression16 while successfully supplanting the goal of an 
imperfect state law.  
Part I of this Note describes the First Amendment and 
its scope. Part II briefly addresses the history of the Court’s 
position in reviewing prisoners’ rights cases. Part III discusses 
  
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-201 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (2001); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 9103 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
14-31 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-81 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5301 (2004); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 (LexisNexis 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West 2003); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (LexisNexis 2005); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 752-E (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-622 
(LexisNexis 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 611A.68 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-5 (2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.045 
(West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104d (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-1836 
(1999); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01 
(LexisNexis 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.01 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22 § 17 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN.. § 8312 (West); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25.1-18 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-530 
(2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28A-1 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-403 (2000); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.3 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (2004); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2B-2 (LexisNexis 2004); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-40-301 to -303 (2007); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West 2007) (held unconstitutional in Keenan v. Superior Court 
of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718, 721 (Cal. 2002); see discussion infra Part IV.C); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS. ANN. Ch. 258A §§ 1, 9 (West 1992) (repealed 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 217.007 (LexisNexis 2005) (held unconstitutional in Seres v. Lerner, 102 P.3d 91 
(Nev. 2004)); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-26 to -33 (West 2001) (repealed in 2003); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (LexisNexis 2006) (repealed 2006).  
 14 Melissa J. Malecki, Son of Sam: Has North Carolina Remedied the Past 
Problems of Criminal Anti-Profit Legislation?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 677 (2006) (“[N]o 
Son of Sam law challenged for constitutionality in relation to the First Amendment has 
been able to withstand the attack . . . .”). 
 15 Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120-23 
(1991). 
 16 “Expression” is not in the First Amendment, but it is nonetheless an 
accepted term. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1 
n.1 (1984). It includes all forms of expression, including those specifically mentioned in 
the First Amendment (free speech, press, etc.) and those that have come within its 
reach, including association, art, and music. Id. 
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the Supreme Court’s deference to prison administration in its 
regulation of prisoners. Part IV focuses on how prison 
administration deference may accomplish the goal of an 
otherwise unconstitutional law by highlighting California’s 
Son-of-Sam law. Finally, Part V focuses on Johnson’s case 
specifically and suggests extending the scope of judicial review 
in prisoners’ First Amendment rights cases. 
I.  THE SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”17 Taken literally, 
the First Amendment protects the spoken word exclusively.18 
Supreme Court cases, however, have not limited First 
Amendment protection to spoken or written words.19 Instead, 
the Court construes speech to include non-verbal forms of 
expression, or symbolic speech, which comes within the ambit 
of the First Amendment.20  
  
 17 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 18 The First Amendment also protects the press, religion, assembly and the 
right to petition the Government. Id. Textually, however, the only form of individual 
expression it protects is speech. Id. Arguably the most protected speech is political 
speech, where only “a clear and present danger” justifies suppression. See Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 19 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 569 (U.S. 1995) (“[T]he Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as 
mediums of expression.”). Supreme Court cases “have never suggested that expression 
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matter—to take a 
nonexhaustive list of labels—is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.” Abood 
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). Various Supreme Court cases 
highlight the broad range of expression protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that expression by means of 
motion pictures is protected by the First Amendment’s free speech and free press 
clauses); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568-69 (finding that parades, in which the collective goal 
of marchers is to make a statement, is a form of expression protected by the First 
Amendment). Although recognized, certain kinds of expression merit less protection 
than others. Obscenity, for example, may be seen to merit a lower level of protection 
because its “patently offensive way” of portraying sex lacks any “serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  
 20 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (finding that a Texas 
law which banned flag desecration violated the “bedrock principle” that the 
“government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 
U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981) (nude dancing not excluded from First Amendment protection); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (wearing an 
armband); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966) (silent library sit-in). 
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Scholars have tried to define the speech that is 
protected by the First Amendment.21 For many, however, the 
real question of what comes within the First Amendment’s 
scope lies in the values the amendment is meant to protect. 
Various theories attempt to pinpoint the extent of the First 
Amendment protection by focusing on specific values.22 One 
example is the liberty model.23 Under this model, the First 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to expression from 
government restrictions.24 An individual’s verbal and non-
verbal expressions are within the First Amendment’s 
protection because its purpose is to further individual self-
realization and self-determination.25 Thus, the purpose of the 
First Amendment is to permit individual growth for both the 
speaker and the recipient by encouraging diverse viewpoints.26 
Moreover, any limitation on individual expression hampers 
society’s development as a whole.27  
  
 21 For example, Professor Emerson’s theory distinguishes between expression 
and action. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (1970). 
Although expression and action often go hand-in-hand, the extent to which conduct is 
expressive determines its protection. Id. at 17-18. Expression is conduct that must be 
unbridled and encouraged. Id. at 17. Action, however, is controllable but not if it 
imposes on expression. Id. Thus, the government can regulate actions to protect certain 
societal interests, but it cannot suppress expression in the process. Id.  
 22 Under the marketplace model, the rationale for free expression is the 
search for truth. REDISH, supra note 16, at 45-46 (discussing John Stuart Mill’s theory 
that the competition of ideas leads to truth); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 4-5 (1998). Information is viewed as a public good, and expression fosters 
the exchange of that good. Id. at 5. Critics of the marketplace model cite media control 
and the inability of economically disadvantaged groups from accessing information as 
impediments to the model’s goals. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 965-66 (1978), reprinted in THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: A READER 82 (John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer eds., 1992). Under 
the market-failure model, states should intervene to ensure that free speech fosters 
ideas and achieves beneficial societal goals. Id. at 966. 
 23 Baker, supra note 22, at 964.  
 24 Id. at 966. Freedom of expression and personal fulfillment are the 
cornerstone of the “self-realization” theories of the First Amendment. FARBER, supra 
note 22, at 4.  
 25 Baker, supra note 22, at 966. 
 26 FARBER, supra note 22, at 4 (“If people lack access to a wide range of ideas, 
they are prevented from imagining the full range of possibilities in their lives.”). Unlike 
the marketplace model, however, the focus is not on the exchange of ideas to weed out 
falsehood. Baker, supra note 22, at 967 (“[T]ruth is discovered through its competition 
with falsehood for acceptance.”). Rather, the free speech clause protects the “value of 
speech conduct to the individual.” Id. at 966. For a discussion on the marketplace, 
market failure and liberty models of the free speech clause, see generally Baker, supra 
note 22.  
 27 FARBER, supra note 22, at 4 (arguing that restricting expression limits “the 
ability of writers and artists to express their perspectives, impoverishing the national 
culture”).  
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Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining the First 
Amendment’s protected speech boundaries,28 or the particular 
set of values it is said to protect, the government can restrict 
the “time, place, or manner of speech.”29 Any restriction, 
however, is subject to judicial review under a standard ranging 
from strict scrutiny to mere rational review.30 A regulation 
survives strict scrutiny if its restriction on a fundamental right 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest.31 An intermediate standard of review requires that the 
regulation be substantially related to an important 
governmental interest.32 A rational level of review requires only 
that the regulation bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate 
government interest.33 In the free speech context, a content-
based restriction must withstand strict scrutiny analysis.34 
Such content-based regulations include those that restrict an 
inmate’s right to profit from crime-related expressions.35 A 
content-neutral restriction must survive an intermediate level 
of review.36  
Prison regulations, however, that impose upon an 
inmate’s free speech rights are subject to the lowest level of 
review.37 The government has a special relationship with an 
inmate speaker.38 This relationship gives the government a 
unique regulatory power over the inmate that it does not have 
with the private individual.39 The crucial issue for the Court is 
the extent to which a particular situation “fall[s] outside the 
‘normal’ First Amendment rules,” and its willingness to defer to 
  
 28 Articulating a workable definition is at the core of the problem. Overly 
simplistic definitions fail for their lack of “analytical or predictive value,” whereas 
consistent definitions strip the freedom of rights the Amendment is intended to protect. 
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 265, 275 (1981).  
 29 FARBER, supra note 22, at 15. 
 30 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL.. 
L. REV. 297, 303 (1997). The Court’s three-tiered approach in reviewing free speech 
restrictions stems from its review of equal protection challenges, where the Court has 
traditionally used this approach. Id.  
 31 Id. at 303-04. 
 32 Id. at 303. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 304-05. 
 35 See discussion on Simon & Schuster infra Part IV.B. 
 36 Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 305. 
 37 See discussion on Turner v. Safley infra Part III.B. 
 38 FARBER, supra note 22, at 15.  
 39 Id. at 15, 187 (“Given its custodial authority in [prisons, the government] 
has an unusually broad interest in controlling speech . . . .”).  
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government officials.40 In the case of inmates, the strong 
judicial deference to prison officials resulted in the lowest-level 
standard of judicial review.41  
II. THE COURT’S “IRON CURTAIN” 
The Court’s deference to prison administrators’ 
decisions stems from the purpose of incarceration. 
Imprisonment as a form of punishment became prevalent in 
the early nineteenth century.42 It replaced the more violent 
forms of punishment that prevailed during colonization, 
including whipping and execution by hanging.43 Rehabilitation 
became the goal of imprisonment.44 Because it was believed 
idleness resulted in crime, rehabilitation consisted of an inmate 
working during the day, either alone or with other inmates, 
and sleeping alone at night.45 Inmates were not allowed to 
speak to each other and could only read the Bible.46 This view 
persisted until the twentieth century, when reformers argued 
that the current state of prisons further hardened a criminal.47 
Despite the push for reform, questions as to whether an inmate 
retained any constitutional rights resulted in little change.48 
Thus, until the mid-twentieth century, courts adhered to the 
“hands-off” doctrine.49  
The hands-off doctrine embodied the Court’s 
unwillingness to review prison administrators’ decisions. 
Under the doctrine, federal courts avoided addressing whether 
prisoners retained any constitutional rights.50 The primary 
function of the courts was to ensure the freedom of illegally 
confined individuals, not to “superintend the treatment and 
  
 40 Id. at 15. 
 41 See discussion on Turner infra Part III.B. 
 42 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 6 (3d ed. 2002). 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 6-7. 
 45 Id. at 7. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. at 8. Today, however, solitary confinement, or segregation, remains a 
staple in prison management. The SHU is a modern-day embodiment of this traditional 
form of punishment, which has received criticism for its emotional and mental impact 
on prisoners. See generally Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and 
International Human Rights: Why the U.S. Prison System Fails Global Standards, 21 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71 (2005). 
 48 MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 10. 
 49 Id. at 9. 
 50 Id. at 10. 
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discipline of prisoners.”51 Although the Court acknowledged 
some claims of racial discrimination and unsafe prison 
conditions as egregious, the hands-off doctrine prevented the 
Court from addressing these claims.52 Because the Court 
believes prison administrators are better suited to make prison 
regulations, it avoided any judicial interference in prison 
administrative decisions.53 Prison administrators have to deal 
with inmates on a daily basis.54 Thus, there is a fear that 
judicial review may threaten prison officials’ authority.55 
Despite the doctrine’s pervasiveness, the mid-twentieth 
century brought a change to the judiciary’s point of view. The 
Court became increasingly concerned with protecting the rights 
of “discrete and insular minorities,” which loosened its 
adherence to the doctrine.56 It acknowledged the rights of 
accused individuals and inmates, irrespective of the prison 
walls.57 Stating that there is “no iron curtain” between the 
Constitution and prisons, Justice White vocally ended the long-
held belief that judicial intervention had no place in prison 
administration.58 Thus, inmates have constitutional rights 
which federal courts have a duty to protect whenever a prison 
regulation “offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee.”59  
  
 51 Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951). 
 52 See Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 287, 290 (D. Alaska 1951).  
 53 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). 
 54 The Turner Court explicitly mentions this concern in articulating its 
standard of review in prisoner rights cases. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) 
(“Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny 
analysis would hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt 
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.”). 
 55 MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 11-12. 
 56 The Court’s review of police and prosecutorial treatment of accused 
individuals surged in the 1960s. Lorijean Golichowski Oei, The New Standard of 
Review for Prisoners’ Rights: A “Turner” for the Worse?: Turner v. Safley, 33 VILL. L. 
REV. 393, 399-401 (1988). For example, the Court deemed a confession inadmissible 
after the accused requested, but was denied, the assistance of counsel in Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 478 (1964), and found inadmissible the results of a search 
violating the Fourth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 57 See Oei, supra note 56, at 399-403. 
 58 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). (“[A] prisoner is not 
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is 
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”). 
 59 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974), overruled by 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
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III. THE SUPREME COURT’S STANDARD: TURNER V. SAFLEY 
A. The Road to Turner 
The Court’s attempt to lift the iron curtain, however, 
may be best described as a mere parting. Because prison 
administrators determine both the goals of a prison and the 
means by which to obtain them,60 the Supreme Court accords 
“substantial deference to [their] professional judgment.”61 
Moreover, a prisoner bears the burden of disproving a 
regulation’s validity.62 Restrictions on First Amendment rights 
are permitted, so long as they are reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest.63 In particular, the Court gives 
substantial deference to prison administrators if there is the 
potential for a security problem.64 Thus, an inmate faces an 
uphill battle in challenging the constitutionality of a prison 
regulation.65 Nevertheless, its own acknowledgment of the 
accused’s rights and the growing recognition of inmates’ rights 
prompted the Court to guide the lower courts by articulating a 
test for constitutional challenges to prison regulations.66  
  
 60 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id.  
 63 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Lower courts had established 
their own standards. In Carothers v. Follette, an inmate sought to prevent prison 
officials from censoring correspondence to his parents, judges and attorney. 314 F. 
Supp. 1014, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In holding that prison officials violated the inmate’s 
right of expression, the court stated that “[c]ertain restrictions on expression to 
[outsiders]” were acceptable, including restrictions that prevent a legitimate business. 
Id. at 1024 (citing Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 850 (9th Cir. 1951) (denying a 
prisoner’s petition to bar prison administrators from interfering in his business 
dealings)). According to the court, a restriction on freedom of expression must be 
“related both reasonably and necessarily to the advancement of some justifiable 
purpose of imprisonment.” Id. (citations omitted). A restriction is acceptable if prison 
officials show it is reasonably and necessarily related to either prisoner rehabilitation 
or to maintain prison security. Id.  
 64 WILLIAM C. COLLINS, SUPERMAX PRISONS AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
LIABILITY CONCERNS IN THE EXTENDED CONTROL UNIT 72 (2004), available at 
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2004/019835.pdf. A court will defer to prison officials even if 
the absence of a regulation presents only the possibility of a security problem. Id. (“[I]f 
an official says that lack of a particular restriction ‘might’ create a security problem, a 
court will generally defer to that judgment and uphold the challenged restriction under 
the Turner test.”). For a discussion on Turner v. Safley and its four-factor test, see infra 
Part III.B. 
 65 An inmate faces not only substantial judicial deference, but must disprove 
a regulation’s validity. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 132.  
 66 Various tests existed at both the state and federal levels to determine 
when a prison regulation infringed on prisoners’ rights. Many circuits used a strict 
scrutiny standard of review, requiring the state to bring forth a substantial 
government interest furthered by the rule and only a minimal imposition on First 
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1. The Outsider’s Rights 
Initially, the Supreme Court avoided delineating a 
prisoner’s First Amendment rights.67 The Court first held that 
the First Amendment limited a prison regulation’s scope in 
Procunier v. Martinez.68 Nevertheless, it failed to define a 
prisoner’s free speech rights.69 Instead, the Court focused on 
the rights of free citizens as opposed to those of prisoners.70 In 
Martinez, California prison regulations permitted the mailroom 
staff to inspect prisoners’ correspondence.71 Particularly, the 
staff became watchful of any correspondence that complained 
about the prison, expressed “inflammatory” views, or was 
“otherwise inappropriate.”72 Whether a correspondence was 
inflammatory or inappropriate was for the staff to determine.73  
Although the Martinez Court found the regulation 
unconstitutional, its decision focused on the rights of the 
recipient.74 It set a two-part standard of review for regulations 
that violated the First Amendment rights of outsiders: the 
regulation cannot be over-inclusive and it must serve a specific 
state interest.75 Because the sender and recipient had an 
  
Amendment rights. See Oei, supra note 56, at 414 n.97. The more relaxed rational 
standard of review prevailed in other circuits. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 
906, 911 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that deference to prison administrators prevails when 
they are addressing a real danger in the prison). To highlight the confusion among the 
lower courts, the same circuit often applied different tests in reviewing the regulation. 
The Seventh Circuit, for example, applied the lowest level of review in Morales v. 
Schmidt, where it called on the state to proffer a rational relationship between the rule 
and the goal. 489 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1973); see also Oei, supra note 56, at 415 
n.98. Fourteen years later, however, it used a strict scrutiny standard in Rios v. Lane, 
calling for the state to present an important government interest that imposed 
incidentally on a prisoner’s First Amendment right. 812 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 
1987); see also Oei, supra note 56, at 414 n.97. 
 67 Oei, supra note 56, at 404-05. The Martinez Court acknowledged the lower 
court’s confusion as to the standard of review, but nevertheless failed to provide 
guidance. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406-08 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh 
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see also Oei, supra note 56, at 404 nn.48, 50. 
 68 416 U.S. at 406. 
 69 See MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 593-94. 
 70 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408 (discussing how mail censorship implicates the 
First Amendment rights of the non-inmates who correspond with the inmates). 
 71 Id. at 399-400 (footnote omitted). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 400. The rule stated that a prisoner’s personal correspondence was “a 
privilege, not a right.” Id. at 399 n.1 (citing Director’s Rule 2401). Under the rule, 
violation of the mail rules might “cause suspension of the mail privileges.” Id. 
 74 Id. at 408-09. 
 75 Id. at 413. The regulation had to further an important “governmental 
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression,” and the limits to free speech “must 
be no greater than is necessary” to protect that governmental interest. Id.  
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interest in the correspondence, the censorship violated the 
rights of both.76 Regardless of the prisoner’s First Amendment 
rights, the regulation burdened the First Amendment interests 
of those outside the prison.77 By focusing on the outsider’s point 
of view, the Martinez Court averted delineating prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights.78  
2. Alternative Means of Communication 
The Court shifted its focus from the outsider to an 
alternative means of communication only two months later. In 
Pell v. Procunier, a California regulation barred the media from 
interviewing certain inmates in person.79 Unlike Martinez, the 
Court did not focus on the outsider’s First Amendment rights. 
Instead, it centered on the prison’s goal in enacting the rule 
and the deference given to prison administrators.80 Prison 
administrators argued that alternative means of 
communication were available to prisoners.81 The prisoners in 
this case could communicate with outsiders, including media 
representatives, by writing to them.82 The Court concluded that 
a regulation fell within the ambit of prison administrators’ 
discretion if a “reasonable and effective means of 
  
 76 Id. at 409. The Martinez Court noted the “array of disparate” standards for 
reviewing prison regulations that restricted freedom of speech. Id. at 406-07; see also 
supra note 66 and accompanying text. This uncertainty not only made it difficult for 
prison officials to determine the appropriateness of their actions, but needlessly 
“perpetuate[d] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison 
administration.” Martinez, 416 U.S. at 407. The Court possibly decided Martinez on the 
narrower issue of the outsider’s First Amendment right to avoid a flurry of free speech 
violation claims by prisoners. See MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 12. 
 77 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409. 
 78 Oei, supra note 56, at 406. The Court would later narrow Martinez in light 
of Turner: In Thornburgh v. Abbott, prisoners challenged Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(“FBP”) rules which gave wardens the authority to reject publications they considered 
detrimental to the prison’s security. 490 U.S. 401, 403 (1989). The Court of Appeals 
applied Martinez instead of Turner because the regulation restricted the free speech 
rights of publishers. Abbott v. Messe, 824 F.2d 1166, 1168-70 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (setting a rational relation standard of review for regulations 
that restrict a prisoner’s free speech right); see also infra Part III.B. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that a strict scrutiny standard of review did not give “sufficient 
sensitivity” to prison officials’ discretion. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 409-10. Moreover, 
unlike Martinez, the regulation in Thornbourgh dealt with incoming, as opposed to 
outgoing, correspondence. Id. at 412. 
 79 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 820-21 (1974). 
 80 Id. at 827. 
 81 Id. at 823-24. 
 82 Id. at 824. 
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communication remain[ed] open” to prisoners83 and there was 
no discrimination as to the content involved.84  
3. Security Concerns and the Exaggerated Response 
Another justification for judicial deference centered on 
security concerns and whether the regulation amounted to an 
exaggerated prison administrative response.85 The Court has 
been particularly deferential where the prisoner is a recipient. 
In Wolff v. McDonnell, a prisoner challenged a prison 
regulation that permitted the inspection of mail sent by his 
attorney.86 Prison administrators, however, expressed concern 
over contraband secretly making its way to prisoners.87 
Although First Amendment rights may protect an outsider 
against “censoring of inmate mail,” it did not necessarily 
protect the inmate.88 The Court cannot confine prison 
regulations to “constitutional straightjacket[s],”89 but must 
consider a prison’s rehabilitative goals and prison security.90 As 
it did in the past, the Court’s analysis required deference to the 
regulation.91 The regulation did not abridge the prisoner’s 
rights because prison officials were merely opening, not 
reading, the correspondence.92 Additionally, prison officials 
were doing so in front of the prisoner.93 Moreover, prison 
  
 83 Id. at 824-25. 
 84 Id. at 826. 
 85 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab. Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 127-28 (1977); 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974). 
 86 McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 575. 
 87 Id. at 577. 
 88 Id. at 575-76. Under Martinez, the outsider’s First Amendment rights are 
protected from censorship, unless there is a legitimate government interest. Procunier 
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 
401 (1989). The McDonnell Court, however, refused to specifically recognize the 
prisoner’s right. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 575-76. Instead, it focused on the regulation, 
thus avoiding a delineation of prisoners’ First Amendment rights in this context. Id. 
(“We need not decide, however, which, if any, of the asserted rights are operative here, 
for the question is whether, assuming some constitutional right is implicated, it is 
infringed by the procedure now found acceptable by the State.”). 
 89 McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563. 
 90 Id. at 561-63. 
 91 Id. at 568. Under the challenged prison regulation, prison officials could 
inspect “all incoming and outgoing mail” including mail from prisoners’ attorneys. Id. 
at 574. The Court, however, found that prison officials had “done all, and perhaps even 
more, than the Constitution requires” by opening marked attorney mail in front of the 
inmate. Id. at 576-77 (“[F]reedom from censorship is not equivalent to freedom from 
inspection or perusal.”).  
 92 Id. at 577. 
 93 Id. at 576-77. 
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officials had a valid security concern that contraband would be 
smuggled to prisoners, even in prisoner-attorney 
correspondence.94 
Security concerns also contributed to the Court’s 
deference in Bell v. Wolfish.95 Prisoners brought a First 
Amendment challenge to a regulation that only allowed 
inmates to receive hard-cover books if they were sent directly 
from a publisher, book store, or book club.96 As it did in 
McDonnell, prison administrators pointed to the concern over 
concealed contraband, this time hidden in books.97 The Court 
again applied a rational relationship standard of review and 
found no First Amendment violation.98 The regulation only 
imposed a limitation on an inmates’ receipt of reading 
materials, a limitation which was rationally related to the 
government’s goals.99 
Prison administrators also raised security concerns 
when prisoners challenged an anti-union regulation. The Court 
again emphasized its deference in Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.100 Prisoners challenged the 
regulation as violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.101 Prison administrators expressed concern over the 
tension likely to emerge between the unionized prisoners and 
prison staff.102 Prison administrators claimed that this tension, 
coupled with the tension likely to arise between unionized and 
non-unionized prisoners, would result in prison riots and 
  
 94 Id. at 577. The district court allowed prison officials to open incoming 
attorney-inmate correspondence if there was a likelihood of contraband presence. Id. at 
574. Prison officials had to open mail marked “privileged” in front of the inmate. Id. 
The Court of Appeals further restricted prison officials’ ability to open “privileged” mail 
by implying that any doubt as to whether the mail came from an attorney could be 
resolved via “a simple telephone call.” Id. at 574-75. The Supreme Court, however, 
considered checking every single piece of attorney correspondence an administrative 
impossibility. Id. at 576. 
 95 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 96 United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 333, 340 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), overruled by Bell, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 97 Bell, 441 U.S. at 549. They also claimed an interest in avoiding the 
administrative cost of conducting more thorough book inspections. Id. 
 98 Id. at 550-51. 
 99 Oei, supra note 56, at 412 (footnote omitted). Not only was the regulation 
content-neutral, but prisoners could still receive other reading material from any 
source, including soft-cover books and magazines. Bell, 441 U.S. at 551-52. This 
alternative means supported prison officials’ argument that the regulation was not 
overly broad. See id. at 550-51. 
 100 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
 101 Id. at 122. 
 102 Id. at 127.  
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chaos.103 The Court considered these security concerns 
legitimate government interests rationally related to the union 
ban.104 Unless rules constitute an exaggerated response, courts 
should give deference to prison administrators’ expertise.105  
B. The Supreme Court Solidifies Its Deferential Stance  
Thirteen years after tip-toeing around prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights in Martinez,106 the Court solidified its 
deferential stance in prison regulation challenges. In Turner v. 
Safley, the Court laid out the four factors courts should use to 
determine the constitutionality of a prison regulation.107 In 
Turner, prisoners challenged two Missouri prison rules as 
violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.108 The 
first prevented inmate-to-inmate correspondence.109 The second 
regulation prevented inmates from marrying without the 
superintendent’s approval.110 After setting out and applying its 
new standard, the Court upheld the first but struck down the 
second as unconstitutional.111 
Although “prison walls [may] not form a barrier 
separating inmates” from Constitutional protections,112 the 
Court did not apply the Martinez test because Martinez did not 
“resolve the question that it framed.”113 In cases involving only 
  
 103 Jones, 433 U.S. at 127. 
 104 Id. at 129. 
 105 Id. at 128. 
 106 MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 592. 
 107 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). 
 108 Id. at 85.  
 109 Id. An inmate could only correspond with an inmate in another prison if 
that inmate was an immediate family member. Id. The rule also allowed an inmate to 
correspond with another “concerning legal matters.” Id. Otherwise, an inmate could 
only correspond with another if a team of experts determined it was in his best 
interest. Id. at 82 (“[T]he determination whether to permit inmates to correspond was 
based on [the treatment] team members’ familiarity with the progress reports . . . .”). 
 110 Id. Only a “compelling” justification warranted the superintendent’s 
approval of an inmate’s marriage. Id. Though the regulation did not define 
“compelling,” prison officials testified that it generally meant pregnancy or the birth of 
a child. Id.  
 111 Id. at 99-100. 
 112 Id. at 84. 
 113 Turner, 482 U.S. at 85; see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), 
overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). The regulation must “further 
an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of 
expression.” Id. Prison officials must show that the regulation furthers the 
government’s interest in prison “security, order, and rehabilitation.” Id. The restriction 
cannot be “unnecessarily broad.” Id. at 414. Rather, it must be “no greater than is 
necessary or essential to the protection” of the cited interest. Id. at 413. 
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prisoners’ rights, the “inflexible strict scrutiny analysis” in 
Martinez would impede prison administrators’ ability to take 
proactive steps that prevent security problems.114 Moreover, 
adopting the standard in cases concerning only prisoners’ 
rights would make courts “the primary arbiters of what [is] the 
best solution” to an issue specifically within prison 
administrators’ domain.115 Without the experience in planning 
or financial resources necessary to operate a prison, courts 
should defer to prison administrators.116 This is further 
buttressed when acknowledging prison administration’s role as 
an arm of the legislative and executive branches.117 
1. The Turner Factors  
Given prison administrators’ expertise, the Court 
adopted a reasonable relationship standard of review.118 Four 
factors determine the reasonableness of a prison regulation 
that restricts inmates’ First Amendment rights.119 A court must 
consider (1) if the regulation has a “valid, rational connection” 
to a legitimate government interest;120 (2) if the prisoner can 
exercise the particular right via other available means; (3) the 
impact on guards, inmates, and other resources that an 
accommodation of the right would have; and (4) whether prison 
administrators can accomplish their goals via “ready 
alternatives” that do not impose on the prisoner’s rights.121 The 
“ready alternative” must not only accommodate an inmate’s 
  
 114 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  
 115 Id.  
 116 Id. at 84-85. 
 117 Id. Separation of powers, according to the Court, warranted a “policy of 
judicial restraint.” Id. at 85. Moreover, there are inherent federalism concerns when 
federal courts dictate state prisoners’ rights. Id. at 84-85 (Prison management 
“requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are 
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of 
government.”); see also MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 595-96.  
 118 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (“If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not already resolved 
the question posed in Martinez, we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges 
on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.”). 
 119 Id. at 89-91.  
 120 Id. at 89 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
 121 Id. at 90-91. Prison administrators, however, need not “set up and then 
shoot down” all possible alternative methods of accommodating a prisoner’s right. 
Nevertheless, if the prisoner can show that an existing alternative accommodates his 
right without hampering the valid penological interest, a court may consider the 
existence of such an alternative as evidence that the regulation is an “exaggerated 
response” to the prison’s concerns. Id.  
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right, but must also be obvious and bear only a de minimis 
impact on the penological goal.122  
The Court applied each of the factors to the two rules 
and found that the prohibition on inmate-to-inmate mail  was 
constitutional.123 According to prison officials, by restricting 
prisoners’ communication with each other, the regulation 
limited the potential for the formation of escape plans and gang 
communication.124 Given the presence of prison gangs, the 
prohibition on inmate-to-inmate correspondence was “logically 
connected” to prison administrators’ concern that the 
correspondence would result in “a potential spur [of] criminal 
behavior.”125 Moreover, the second factor was satisfied because 
the regulation only limited the “class of other people” with 
whom the prisoner could communicate.126 According to the 
Court, this is a valid security concern because the class 
includes other Missouri prison inmates.127 Thus, the regulation 
was not a full-fledged deprivation of prisoners’ means of 
expression.128  
  
 122 Id. at 90-91. 
 123 Id. at 91. According to the Court, the record indicated a reasonable 
relationship between the regulation and the legitimate security concern of preventing 
prison violence. Id. The Court also acknowledged that the more demanding Martinez 
test may apply to the marriage rule, since the rights of a civilian—an outsider—may be 
affected. Id. at 96-97. However, because the rule “swe[pt] much more broadly” than 
necessary, it was not “reasonably related” to the prison’s security and rehabilitation 
goals. Id. at 98. Prison administrators argued that the rule prevented the security 
threat posed by “love triangles.” Id. They ignored, however, that love triangles could 
exist regardless of a prisoner’s marital status. Id. (“[S]urely in prisons housing both 
male and female prisoners, inmate rivalries are as likely to develop without a formal 
marriage ceremony as with one.”). Moreover, the prison had an obvious, low-cost 
alternative in the FBP regulations, which allow prisoners to marry so long as the 
warden does not deem the marriage a security threat. Id.; see also 3 MICHAEL B. 
MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 30-37 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing marriage rights in 
prison). 
 124 Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. Prison administrators believed that if inmates 
corresponded with those of other institutions, they might orchestrate escape plans and 
assaults. Id. Moreover, the regulation, coupled with placing gang members in different 
institutions, limited prison gang activity. Id. 
 125 Id. at 91-92. The Court noted that even federal law conditions federal 
parole on “nonassociation with known criminals.” Id. at 92; see 28 C.F.R. 
§ 2.204(a)(5)(v) (1987) (“The releasee shall not associate with a person who has a 
criminal record without permission from the supervision officer.”). A ban on “this sort 
of contact” within the prison is therefore logical. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.  
 126 Turner, 482 U.S. at 92. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. Not only did the restriction apply to the class of individuals with whom 
inmates could communicate, but it was also the state’s policy of separating gang 
members in order to control gang activity. Id.  
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Likewise, the third factor weighed in favor of 
deference.129 Its focus is on the accommodation’s impact on the 
prison, its resources, guards, and other inmates.130 An 
accommodation of the prisoners’ asserted right here threatened 
“the core functions of prison administration, maintaining safety 
and internal security” by making it easier for prisoners to 
organize informally.131 The result of striking the regulation 
would likely create a detrimental “ripple effect” that 
jeopardized the liberty and safety of prisoners and guards at 
multiple prisons.132 In light of this tradeoff, the Court refused to 
disregard the prison administrators’ decision, particularly 
given the expertise required to make such decisions.133  
As to the fourth factor, the Court found no clear 
alternative that could serve prison administrators’ interests 
without restricting prisoners’ free speech right.134 Inmates 
contended that prison administrators had the option of 
monitoring inmate-to-inmate mail.135 This alternative, however, 
required more than “a de minimis cost on the [prison 
administrator’s] pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.”136 
Requiring staff to inspect each correspondence, coupled with 
the possibility of inmate-to-inmate communication via “jargon 
or codes,” was an inadequate alternative to simply banning 
inmate-to-inmate correspondence altogether.137 The Court 
found the regulation content-neutral, “reasonably related to 
  
 129 Id.  
 130 Id. at 90-91. 
 131 Id. at 92. Prison administrators expressed similar organizational concerns 
over prison unions in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 
(1977); see supra Part III.A.3. Here, the Court finds the concern to be even greater than 
in Prisoners’ Labor Union, since accommodating the right would impact the security 
concerns of more than one prison. Turner, 482 U.S. at 92. 
 132 Turner, 482 U.S. at 92.  
 133 Id. at 92-94 (“Where exercise of a right requires this kind of tradeoff, we 
think that the choice made by corrections officials—which is, after all, a judgment 
‘peculiarly within [their] province and professional expertise’—should not be lightly set 
aside by the courts.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). 
 134 Id. at 93. The Court turned to the FBP for guidance. Id. The FBP, however, 
similarly restricted inmate-to-inmate correspondence to “protect institutional order 
and security.” Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 540.17 (1986). 
 135 Turner, 482 U.S. at 93. The proffered alternative echoed that which the 
Court rejected in McDonnell. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974) (“If 
prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an 
attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration 
would be imposed.”).  
 136 Turner, 482 U.S. at 93.  
 137 Id. (noting that gang members in federal prison often use codes to 
communicate in their correspondence). 
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[the] valid [penological] goals” of security and safety and not 
“an exaggerated response” to those objectives.138 Thus, the 
regulation did not unconstitutionally restrict inmates’ free 
expression right. 
2. An Analysis of the Turner Factors  
The Turner Court clearly enunciated its deference to 
prison administrators’ regulations. The Court, however, gave 
little guidance on how to apply the Turner test.139 The first 
factor calls for a rational connection between the prison rule 
and the legitimate government interest it is said to further.140 
The lack of a connection or a weak link weighs in favor of 
striking the regulation.141 While there are some exceptions,142 it 
is arguably an easy factor for prison officials to meet.143 The 
government’s interests in rehabilitating prisoners, prison 
security, and even budgetary concerns present an array of 
reasons for satisfying this factor.144 
The application of the second factor is vague. When 
considering a regulation’s validity, a court must consider the 
“judicial deference owed to [prison] officials” if inmates can 
  
 138 Id.  
 139 MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 28. 
 140 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 
(1984)); see MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 36. Unlike Martinez, prison officials did not 
have to show that the regulation served a substantial government interest. Instead, 
Turner lowered the burden for prison officials. They only needed to show a reasonable 
relationship between the regulation and the asserted penological interest. MUSHLIN, 
supra note 42, at 598-99. 
 141 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 (“[A] regulation cannot be sustained where the 
logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to 
render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”).  
 142 Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (W.D. Wis. 2000). A state 
regulation barred prisoners’ access to sexually explicit material. Prison administrators 
pointed to security maintenance, rehabilitation and sexual harassment prevention as 
“legitimate correctional goals” tied to the regulation. Id. at 1073, 1079. The rule, 
however, was so broad that one could reasonably find the absence of a “rational 
connection between the [goal] and the ban” without the need for scientific testimony or 
common sense. Id. at 1080; see MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 31.  
 143 See discussion on Beard v. Banks infra Part III.C. 
 144 See MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 28-29; Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 25 
(5th Cir. 1992) (finding that prison regulation barring long hair and facial hair was 
rationally related to the legitimate government interest of preventing inmates from 
hiding contraband and weapons in their hair and beards as well as prisoner 
identification); Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 261 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding a five-
dollar disciplinary surcharge imposed on prisoners who violated certain prison rules 
because the government had a legitimate interest in deterring misconduct and raising 
revenue). 
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exercise their asserted right via other available avenues.145 
There is uncertainty, however, as to the type of rights courts 
should consider. A court need not seek an alternative to the 
specific right, but may seek an alternative to the general 
right.146 In Turner, the Court did not focus on whether 
prisoners had alternative means of communicating with other 
prisoners but rather on whether they “were deprived of ‘all 
means of expression.’”147 Thus, a court may defer to prison 
administrators even where no alternative to the specific right 
exists.  
The third factor focuses on the impact of accommodating 
the prisoners’ rights.148 Courts should consider the effect on 
guards, prison resources, and other inmates.149 If the 
accommodation results in a “significant ‘ripple effect,’” courts 
must give deference to the “informed discretion of corrections 
officials.”150 Despite an analysis similar to the first factor—both 
factors call for a “reasonableness analysis”—the third deals 
with the rule’s reasonableness vis-à-vis the plaintiff’s proposed 
alternative for operating the prison.151  
Finally, the fourth factor considers whether the prison 
regulation is actually an “exaggerated response” to prison 
administrators’ concern.152 The plaintiff bears the burden of 
suggesting an alternative.153 An inmate must show that an 
obvious, easy alternative exists and that, therefore, the 
regulation is an overreaction to prison administrators’ 
concern.154 A proposed alternative, however, faces rejection if it 
  
 145 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (quoting Pell v. Procunier,, 417 U.S. 817, 827 
(1974)); see Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab. Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 131 (1977). 
 146 See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1987).  
 147 Id. at 352 (emphasis added) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 92). Days after 
deciding Turner, the Court addressed the constitutionality of prison policies that 
prevented Muslim inmates from attending Jumu’ah, a weekly religious service. Id. at 
345. Recalling Turner, the Court’s evaluation of the second factor focused on whether 
inmates lacked all means of expression. Id. at 352. Although there was no alternative 
to attending Jumu’ah specifically, Muslim inmates could still participate in other forms 
of religious expression. Id. 
 148 Turner, 482 U.S at 90. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id.  
 151 MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 36. 
 152 Turner, 482 U.S at 90; see e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 
(1984) (rejecting the lower courts’ finding that disallowing contact visits for pre-trial 
detainees was an excessive response to the security concerns involved).  
 153 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91 (“This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: 
prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative 
method of accommodating the [inmate’s] constitutional complaint.”). 
 154 Id.; see also MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 38.  
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is likely to create a “ripple effect.”155 In other words, if “changes 
to one area of prison administration” have negative 
repercussions in another, the alternative is unlikely to 
withstand judicial scrutiny.156 
C. Narrowing Turner to a Single Factor: Beard v. Banks 
Although the Court discussed a multifactor test in 
Turner, its subsequent application effectively condenses 
Turner’s four factors into a single-factor test.157 While the Court 
is unlikely to revert fully to the days of the hands-off 
doctrine,158 deference to prison administration remains the lens 
through which the Court analyzes a prison regulation. Such 
deference offers a state legislature the opportunity to attain 
goals via prison regulations that would otherwise remain out of 
its reach because of unconstitutional skeins. The Court’s 
language in subsequent cases indicates that unless the 
connection between the challenged prison regulation and the 
interest is invalid, the Court need not address the other Turner 
factors.159 This is not a challenge for prison administrators to 
meet. The state does not have the burden of proving a prison 
regulation’s validity; rather, it is for the “prisoner to disprove 
it.”160 As discussed in the following section, the Court’s 
  
 155 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  
 156 MUSHLIN, supra note 42 at 35-36. 
 157 The Court continued to apply Turner in reviewing prisoner challenges to 
various First Amendment restrictions, including free association and exercise rights. In 
Overton v. Bazzetta, inmates and their friends and family members brought a class 
action against the Michigan Department of Corrections. 539 U.S. 126, 130 (2003). They 
argued that prison regulations violated a prisoner’s First Amendment right to freedom 
of association because they limited visitation from children and suspended visitation 
privileges for substance-abuse violations. Id. at 131; see also Trevor N. McFadden, 
When to Turn to Turner? The Supreme Court’s Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22 
J.L. & POL. 135, 144 (2006). In applying Turner, the Court refused to define the scope 
of the right of association and held that each visitation restriction bore a rational 
relationship to a legitimate penological interest. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 131-35 (“We need 
not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at any length . . . 
because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological 
interests. This suffices to sustain the regulation in question.”). The Court went on to 
apply the remaining Turner factors, even though its language indicated it need not do 
so. Id. at 135-36. The Court also applied Turner in upholding a prison regulation that 
prevented Muslim inmates from attending a religious service. O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987); see supra note 146 and accompanying text.  
 158 But see generally Owen J. Rarric, Kirsch v. Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections: Will the Supreme Court Say “Hands Off” Again?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 305 
(2002) (arguing that Turner’s deferential standard amounts to a modern-day hands-off 
doctrine). 
 159 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579-80 (2006). 
 160 Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 132 (emphasis added). 
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deference to prison administrators under Turner creates an 
opportunity for a state to further a legislative goal by imposing 
on a prisoner’s free speech right.161  
Despite the Court’s analysis of each factor in Turner, 
the Court’s language indicates that unless the connection 
between the challenged regulation and the interest is invalid, 
the Court will not address the other factors.162 Three years 
later, the Court declared that analyzing and balancing each 
Turner factor was unnecessary if the regulation was reasonably 
connected to a legitimate penological interest.163 In Beard v. 
Banks, the Department of Corrections implemented a policy 
that banned inmates in the prison’s long-term segregation unit 
(“LTSU”) from accessing newspapers, magazines and 
photographs.164 The LTSU has two levels of segregation, but 
only inmates in Level Two were denied access to newspapers, 
magazines, and photographs.165 Level Two inmates, however, 
still had access to “legal and personal correspondence, religious 
and legal materials, two library books, and writing paper.”166 If 
after 90 days an inmate’s behavior improved, he could move to 
Level One, where he could receive one newspaper and five 
magazines.167  
The Banks Court addressed each Turner factor quickly 
and, in the end, almost superfluously. Although the 
Department offered several justifications for its regulation, the 
Court zeroed in on one Turner factor. A single government 
justification satisfied the Court: the need to motivate difficult 
prisoners to behave better.168 The goal of eliciting better 
behavior from difficult prisoners by providing an incentive 
  
 161 See discussion on Son-of-Sam law infra Part IV.  
 162 In Bazzetta, the Court analyzed the other Turner factors only after 
concluding that the regulations satisfied the first factor. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 135. 
Nevertheless, the analysis was unnecessary. According to the Court, the regulations 
bore a rational relationship to legitimate interests, which was enough to sustain them. 
Id. at 131-32. Hence, if the first factor is satisfied, there is no need to evaluate the 
remaining Turner factors. Consequently, a regulation is unlikely to withstand Turner if 
it fails to meet the first factor.  
 163 Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2580 (stating that the second, third, and fourth Turner 
factors’ connection to the prison’s goals “add little, one way or another, to the first 
factor’s basic logical rationale.”). 
 164 Id. at 2576. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id.  
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 2578. 
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satisfied all the Turner requirements.169 Limiting the material 
a LTSU inmate can possess was validly, rationally connected to 
the penological goal of inducing inmates to behave better and 
discouraging Level One inmates from “backsliding.”170 
Therefore, the first factor weighed in favor of the 
“reasonableness” of the prison regulation.171 
In applying the remaining Turner factors, the Court 
found that the regulation only limited a prisoner’s access to 
alternatives.172 A prisoner is only able to access some magazines 
and newspapers if his behavior merits movement to Level 
One.173 Even if there is no ready alternative for Level Two 
inmates, the absence only provides “evidence that the 
regulations [a]re unreasonable”174—it is not dispositive.175 
Moreover, accommodating the prisoner’s constitutional right 
would “produce worse behavior,” thus negatively affecting 
prison administration.176 Further, no readily available 
alternative could accommodate the inmate’s constitutional 
right without bearing more than a de minimis cost to prison 
administrators.177  
Despite the Court’s application of the Turner 
requirements, it clearly stated that its deference to the 
Department’s regulation lies not in the balancing of the 
factors.178 The second, third and fourth factors “add little . . . to 
the first factor’s basic logical rationale.”179 Rather, the “real 
task in this case”180 laid in determining whether the 
Department showed not just a logical, but “a reasonable 
relation” between the regulation and the penological goal.181 
  
 169 Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2578-79. Prison administrators offered three 
justifications for the regulation: to motivate inmates to behave better; to minimize 
inmate property; and to minimize the amount of material inmates can potentially use 
as a weapon. Id. at 2579. According to the Court, “the first rationale itself satisfies 
Turner’s requirements.” Id. 
 170 Id.  
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 2579-80. 
 173 Id. at 2579. 
 174 Id. at 2580 (citations omitted).  
 175 Id. (citations omitted). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. (emphasis added).  
 181 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Thus, in certain cases, satisfying the first Turner factor 
warrants judicial deference to prison administrators. 
IV.  A CASE IN POINT: CALIFORNIA’S SON-OF-SAM LAW 
By deciding Banks on essentially one Turner factor, the 
Court gives prison administrators and their regulations ample 
opportunity to succeed in the courts. Such deferential 
treatment allows states to accomplish otherwise unreachable 
punitive goals. To illustrate, state laws that bar convicted 
criminals from profiting from their crimes have faced 
constitutional challenges.182 It is not unreasonable for a state to 
prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes: not only 
does this show respect for the victim, but it also sends the 
message that crime truly doesn’t pay. These so-called Son-of-
Sam laws, however, have faced intense judicial scrutiny.183 
Although the Court’s standard of review is higher when 
reviewing Son-of-Sam laws, a prison regulation can accomplish 
at least one goal of these laws without facing the same level of 
judicial scrutiny. If a state goal is to bar criminals from 
profiting from their crimes, a prison regulation that bars “any 
business dealing” without the warden’s permission can reach 
virtually every profit a criminal can make.184 Thus, a regulation 
has the potential of unfairly imposing on a criminal’s right to 
free expression, while also accomplishing the goal of another 
state law. If challenged, such a regulation is likely to withstand 
judicial scrutiny, even though a state’s Son-of-Sam law would 
not.185 
A. Preventing the Profiting from Crime: Background of the  
Son-of-Sam Laws 
A state has a compelling interest in preventing 
criminals from profiting from their crimes.186 Son-of-Sam laws, 
  
 182 See infra Part IV.A-C. 
 183 See infra Part IV.A-C. 
 184 Victim compensation was one of the New York legislature’s goals in 
enacting the first Son-of-Sam law. Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1991). Another goal was to prevent criminals from profiting from 
their crimes. Id. Judicial deference to prison administrator’s business-dealings 
regulation may not necessarily foster victims’ compensation (Johnson’s profits, for 
example, are not redirected to his victims), but it nonetheless has the potential to 
prevent a criminal from making any profit. 
 185 See infra Part IV.B-C. 
 186 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118. 
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named after the notorious New York serial killer, were enacted 
to prevent a criminal from profiting from his or her crime.187 
Nearly every state has or had a Son-of-Sam law on the books.188 
Outraged by the possibility of a murderer profiting from his 
crimes,189 the New York legislature passed the first Son-of-Sam 
law.190 The law enabled the state to seize any profit a criminal 
made from the sale of stories related to his or her crimes and to 
place the profits in a fund for the crime victims.191 New York’s 
Son-of-Sam law faced constitutional challenges in Simon & 
Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board.192 
B. Simon & Schuster: Standard for Legitimate Curtailment  
of Profits 
Simon & Schuster highlighted the constitutional defects 
of New York’s Son-of-Sam law.193 A mobster-turned-government 
witness, Henry Hill, sold the story of his life in the mob to the 
publisher Simon & Schuster.194 New York’s Crime Victim’s 
Board determined that the book fell within New York’s Son-of-
  
 187 The roots of Son-of-Sam laws lay in the media attention that followed the 
crimes of David Berkowitz. Sam Roberts, Criminals, Authors, and Criminal Authors, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1987, § 7, at 1. Between 1976 and 1977, Berkowitz killed six and 
injured seven people in New York City while sending letters to authorities and the 
media under the pseudonym “Son of Sam.” Id.; see also Anemona Hartocollis, Court 
Hears “Son of Sam” in Dispute over Personal Mementos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at 
B4. 
 188 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 189 Roberts, supra note 187, at 1. 
 190 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991) (amended by 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-1(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993)). The law specifically stated that: 
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity 
contracting with any person or the representative . . . of any person, accused 
or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such 
crime . . . or from the expression of such accused or convicted person’s 
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime, shall submit a 
copy of such contract to the board and pay over to the board any moneys 
which would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the person so 
accused or convicted or his representative.  
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982). 
 191 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991) (amended by N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 632-1(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993)). (Because the original law applied to 
convicted criminals, it had no effect on Berkowitz, who was adjudged incompetent to 
stand trial. Nevertheless, he voluntarily gave the royalties he received from the book 
Son of Sam to his victims. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 111.) 
 192 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 105. 
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. at 112. 
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Sam law.195 The Victim’s Board ordered Hill to hand over the 
profits made under the contract and ordered Simon & Schuster 
to turn over any future moneys payable to Hill.196 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the statute 
violated the First Amendment.197 Content-based restrictions, 
which focus on the subject of the prisoner’s speech, are 
presumptively unconstitutional.198 A financially burdensome 
law based on the speaker’s speech content, as opposed to 
speech generally, is “presumptively inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.”199 Unless the statute was narrowly tailored to a 
compelling governmental interest, it violated the First 
Amendment.200 Although the state had a compelling interest in 
victim compensation, particularly “from the fruits of [a] crime,” 
New York’s Son-of-Sam Law was not narrowly tailored to meet 
that goal.201 The statute specifically targeted the content of 
speech—the author’s crime—imposing a financial burden it did 
not impose on other types of speech.202 The Court found the 
statute overly inclusive in two ways: (1) the subject of the work 
is irrelevant, so long as there is a mention, even in passing, of 
the author’s crimes; and (2) convictions were irrelevant.203  
  
 195 Id. at 114. 
 196 Id. at 114-15. 
 197 Id. at 123. 
 198 Id. at 115. Generally, the extent of the First Amendment’s protection turns 
on whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral. See FARBER, supra note 
22, at 21; John B. Kopf III, Note, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.: Contorting Secondary 
Effects and Diluting Intermediate Scrutiny to Ban Nude Dancing, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 
823, 826 (2002). A regulation is content-neutral if it “serves purposes unrelated to the 
content of expression.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). A 
content-based regulation considers the substance of expression, such as its topic. Kopf, 
at 827. A content-neutral regulation, however, focuses on the “non-communicative 
impact of expression.” Id. at 828. The Court reviews content-based speech legislation at 
a higher standard, including content-based restrictions on inmates. Simon & Schuster, 
502 U.S. at 115-18. For a review of the content-based and content-neutral distinction, 
see generally Kopf, supra at 825-31. 
 199 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 
439, 447 (1991)). 
 200 Id. at 118. 
 201 Id. at 120-21.  
 202 If an inmate profited from publishing a book on his crime, the regulation 
reallocated those profits to the Victims’ Board. FARBER, supra note 22, at 24. It did not, 
however, prevent the inmate from publishing books. Id. Thus, the regulation was 
content-based because a “criminal could profit from writing a book on any subject 
except for his crimes.” Id. at 24-25.  
 203 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121. There was no distinction between an 
accusation and a conviction—an author’s mere admission that he committed a crime 
sufficed. Id. The Court mentioned, but did not address, the statute’s potential under-
inclusiveness. Id. at 122 n.1. A statute is under-inclusive when its reach becomes too 
narrow to fully serve the state’s interest. Kathleen M. Timmons, Natural Born Writers: 
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C. California’s Son-of-Sam Law: An Unconstitutional  
Anti-Profit Statute 
Despite the constitutional challenges to New York’s law, 
California’s Son-of-Sam law exhibited constitutional flaws 
similar to New York’s.204 In Keenan v. Superior Court,205 Frank 
Sinatra, Jr. sought compensation under California’s then Son-
of-Sam law (Section 2225(b)(1) of the California Civil Code)206 
after his kidnappers agreed to produce a story about the 
kidnapping plot with the New Times Los Angeles.207 After 
selling the story to Columbia Pictures, Sinatra demanded that 
the studio withhold payment to the kidnappers and the New 
Times Los Angeles.208 
The court applied the Simon & Schuster analysis after 
finding that Section 2225(b)(1) “impose[d] content-based 
financial penalties on protected speech”209 similar to the defect 
in the New York law.210 Like the New York law, Section 
2225(b)(1) confiscated income “from all expressive materials, 
  
The Law’s Continued Annoyance with Criminal Authors, 29 GA. L. REV. 1121, 1133 
(1994). Son-of-Sam laws, it is argued, are under-inclusive because they only reach 
profits made “from the publication of the criminal’s thoughts” and not his assets 
overall; thus, they fail to serve the state’s goal of victim compensation. Kevin S. Reed, 
Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes and the First Amendment: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New 
York Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991), 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1060, 
1067 (1992). For an argument on the under- and over-inclusiveness of Son-of-Sam laws, 
see Timmons, supra, at 1141.  
 204 Keenan v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718, 726 n.11 (Cal. 2002) 
(“The New York law, like [California Son-of-Sam Law] Section 2225(b)(1), established 
priorities of claims against the account, including the criminal’s valid claim for 
expenses of legal representation. Unlike Section 2225(b)(1), the New York law allowed 
general creditors of the criminal to reach the impounded funds, but provided that if no 
claims against the account were pending at the end of the five-year period, remaining 
funds in the account would be repaid to the criminal.” (citations omitted)).  
 205 Id. at 718. 
 206 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b)(1) (West 2001) (“All proceeds from the 
preparation for the purpose of sale, the sale of the rights to, or the sale of materials 
that include or are based on the story of a felony for which a convicted felon was 
convicted, shall be subject to an involuntary trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries set 
forth in this section.”). 
 207 Keenan, 40 P.3d at 722-23. Barry Keenan, Joseph Amsler and John Irwin 
conspired to and kidnapped Sinatra in 1963. Id. at 722. Sinatra was released after his 
father, Frank Sinatra, paid a ransom. Id. Sinatra’s business and reputation took a hit 
when his kidnappers told the media that he himself took part in the kidnapping plot, 
although they later admitted this was false. Id. In 1998, the kidnappers agreed to 
produce a story with the New Times Los Angeles. Id. at 722-23. They intended to sell 
the story to print, broadcast, and film media. Columbia Pictures bought the rights to 
the story entitled “Snatching Sinatra.” Id.  
 208 Id. at 723. 
 209 Id. at 725-26. 
 210 Id. 
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whatever their general themes or subjects, that include 
significant discussions of their creators’ past crimes.”211 In 
finding California’s latest version of its Son-of-Sam law 
unconstitutional, the Court held that the statute “penalize[d] 
the content of speech to an extent far beyond that necessary to 
transfer the fruits of crime from criminals to their 
uncompensated victims.”212 The court specifically addressed an 
inmate’s expressive activity, finding that the latest version of 
the statute was over-inclusive.213 The Court’s deference to 
prison administration regulations makes the constitutionality 
of a Son-of-Sam law irrelevant. Regardless of the expression’s 
relation to the crime, the Court’s deferential approach to prison 
administrators’ regulations simultaneously accomplishes the 
state’s goal of limiting an inmate’s profit-making.  
V.  RETHINKING TURNER  
A.  An Application of Turner  
Assuming that Johnson did in fact engage in an 
unauthorized business transaction,214 and that prison 
administrators only barred him from mailing his postcards,215 
  
 211 Id. at 726. 
 212 Id. at 721. 
 213 Id. at 732. Although the court concluded that Section 2225(b)(1) was 
unconstitutional, it did not address Section 2225(b)(2), the “notoriety value” provision 
of the statute; the court specifically stated that it only addressed the “storytelling about 
the crime,” and no other severable portions of the statute. Id. at 729 n.14. 
California’s Son-of-Sam law has a feature New York’s did not; besides 
confiscating a convicted felon’s income from telling his crime story, the 
California statute, by amendments adopted after Simon & Schuster, also 
confiscates profits earned by a convicted felon, or a profiteer, from the sale of 
memorabilia, property, things, or rights for a value enhanced by their felony-
related notoriety value. (section 2225(b)(2).) Thus, it cannot be said that 
California’s law, read as a whole, burdens income from speech as distinct 
from all other crime-related income. The Attorney General urges that this 
distinction between the California and New York statutes means the 
California law is not a content-based regulation of speech. We disagree. 
California’s effort to reach the fruits of crime beyond those derived from 
storytelling about the crime might bear on whether our statute is 
unconstitutionally underinclusive, an issue we need not and do not decide. 
Id. at 729, n.14.  
 214 All of the proceeds from the sale of Johnson’s art went to charity. Liptak, 
Prison Disciplines Publicized Inmate, supra note 9; Curtis, supra note 6. 
 215 While prison administrators barred Johnson from mailing his postcards, it 
is unclear if they disciplined Johnson in other ways, such as by barring him from 
painting altogether. Liptak, Prison Disciplines Publicized Inmate, supra note 9 (“A 
prison artist [Johnson] . . . has been disciplined for what a prison official yesterday 
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the Turner factors are likely to pin the outcome of his case 
before a court in favor of prison administrators. Following 
Banks, a full balancing of the Turner factors is unnecessary.216 
If prison administrators can deliver to the court a valid, 
rational relationship between the regulation and a legitimate 
penological interest, there is no need for a court to consider the 
remaining Turner factors. Moreover, satisfactorily meeting the 
first Turner factor may result in an additional victory for the 
state—that of preventing another criminal from “profiting,” in 
any way, because of his status as a criminal.  
Turner’s first factor acts as a gatekeeper for a court’s 
further analysis. The prison regulation must bear a valid, 
rational relationship to a legitimate penological interest.217 
Prison administrators have cited security and budgetary 
concerns as legitimate interests for enacting a prison 
regulation.218 These concerns provide viable arguments for 
prison administrators in Johnson’s case. They may also cite 
their interest in ensuring that inmates abide by prison 
regulations. Making an exception in Johnson’s case would 
encourage other inmates to engage in “unauthorized business 
dealings” or to break other prison rules. Should these 
arguments satisfy a court, there is no need for further inquiry: 
the analysis stops here.219 Under Banks, so long as prison 
administrators present a single justification logically related to 
their rule, a court will defer to prison administrators.220 
Moreover, analyzing the regulation under the remaining 
Turner factors would likely yield the same result. An 
application of the second factor demonstrates that Johnson is 
in fact able to exercise his right to communicate artistically via 
other means. Prison administrators can argue that, though 
Johnson’s specific right to paint may be restricted, he can still 
exercise his general right to free expression to the extent that 
any prisoner can.221 The Pelican Bay Prison Project’s website 
  
called ‘unauthorized business dealings’ in the sale of his paintings. The prison has also 
barred [Johnson] from sending his paintings through the mail.” (emphasis added)). 
 216 See supra Part III.C for a discussion on Banks. 
 217 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see supra Part III.B for a 
discussion on this factor. 
 218 See supra Part III.A.2-3 for a discussion of the various concerns prison 
administrators presented to the Court. 
 219 See supra Part III.C for a discussion on Banks. 
 220 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006). 
 221 For an example of the specific/general right distinction, see supra note 146 
and accompanying text. 
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includes a section called “Donny’s Page,” in which Johnson’s 
essays on various topics can be found.222 Johnson has also 
written a book in which he describes his life in prison.223 
Further, Johnson could have raised money for charity via the 
Prison Art Project,224 a not-for-profit that supports the artistic 
endeavors of California prisoners225 and returns part of the 
donations to the inmate-artist.226  
Additionally, a court may find that accommodating 
Johnson’s right will negatively impact guards and inmates. If 
Johnson goes unpunished, other inmates may consider it a sign 
that prison administrators are either giving Johnson 
preferential treatment or that prison administrators are 
unlikely to discipline inmates if they violate a prison 
regulation. Either outcome would lead to more prison 
regulation violations, subordination of prison guard authority, 
and a hindrance of prison guards’ ability to maintain prison 
security. Thus, the accommodation’s potential effects are 
sufficient for a court to side with prison administrators. 
The problem lies in the potential likelihood of this result 
under Turner. The regulation can potentially bar Johnson from 
profiting from any exercise of expression, even if his artwork 
exhibits no relation to his crimes. Despite the constitutional 
invalidity of California’s Son-of-Sam laws and the challenges 
that these laws have faced,227 Turner allows the state to prevent 
an inmate from making a profit from any form of expression. 
The result is contrary to one of the very purposes of 
incarceration and, more importantly, to the First Amendment’s 
right to free expression. 
  
 222 Pelican Bay Prison Project: Donny’s Page, http://www.pelicanbayprison 
project.org/donny.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). The webpage states Johnson will 
write an essay monthly and includes links to his past essays. Id.  
 223 Johnson’s book, DONNY: LIFE OF A LIFER, can be ordered through his 
website. Donny Johnson’s Website, http://members.tripod.com/donnyj_pelican/id22.htm 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
 224 Prison Art Project—Prisoner Made Arts and Crafts for Sale, 
http://www.prisonart.org/index.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
 225 Prison Art Project: Prison Art—Donations, http://www.prisonart.org/ 
donate.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
 226 Ten percent of sales proceeds are allocated to maintaining the site. E-mail 
from Ed Mead, Prison Art Project Director, to Melissa Rivero (Jan. 1, 2007, 18:23 EST) 
(on file with author). They are then distributed to inmates, who can use the proceeds 
for any reason, including supporting their families and purchasing art supplies. Id.  
 227 See Malecki, supra note 14, at 681-87. 
840 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
B. The Interests Turner Ignores 
If the goals of the prison system are to both punish and 
rehabilitate, Johnson’s right to exercise his First Amendment 
right to expression serves both goals.228 First, Johnson’s 
inability to mail his paintings impedes rehabilitation.229 
Johnson has stated that proceeds from the sale of his artwork 
will go to an educational fund for the children of other 
inmates.230 Rehabilitation undoubtedly includes an inmate’s 
beneficial contribution to society. Arguably, Johnson’s ability to 
rehabilitate is already limited: he is confined in the SHU and is 
unlikely to ever leave it. There is very little he can do to either 
rehabilitate or contribute to society. Proceeds from his work 
can help children of other inmates, who are already 
disadvantaged by the absence of at least one parent.231 
Johnson’s donations, therefore, may actually contribute to 
crime prevention. 
In terms of punishment, challenges as to the 
constitutionality of confinement in the SHU illustrate the 
severity of this form of punishment.232 Johnson’s crimes merit 
some form of punishment and certainly many years of it. Aside 
from the death penalty, however, confinement in the SHU is as 
severe a punishment as can be imposed on a human being.233 
His years in the SHU, and the many yet to come, serve a 
prison’s punitive function. His status, however, as a criminal 
should not deprive him of the very few rights he has left, 
particularly if they benefit others.  
Furthermore, by classifying sales of an inmate’s artistic 
expression as business dealings, the state can accomplish at 
least one goal that an imperfect law does not. Given the 
relative ease with which prison officials can meet Turner, such 
a regulation can withstand constitutional muster. The criminal 
notoriety associated to Johnson’s art may result in a premium 
  
 228 See supra Part II for a discussion of rehabilitation. 
 229 Vasiliades, supra note 47, at 78-79. Vasiliades discusses the findings of 
psychological studies conducted on inmates in Pelican Bay’s SHUs. According to the 
studies, SHU inmates like Johnson suffer from extreme psychological trauma, 
including irrational anger and suicidal thoughts. Id.  
 230 Liptak, Behind Bars, supra note 1. 
 231 See ELLIOT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82-91 (1998) 
(discussing various preventive measures for thwarting crime, particularly those 
targeted to children of high-risk families, which include single-parent households). 
 232 See generally Vasiliades, supra note 47. 
 233 Id. 
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for his artwork. As it is, many states, including California, 
attempt to limit a criminal’s ability to profit from his crime via 
Son-of-Sam laws.234 In Johnson’s case, the business dealing 
regulation can prevent him from profiting from any form of 
expression. While some may argue that Johnson merely needed 
to ask the warden for permission before mailing his postcards 
for exhibition, a warden can conceivably deny Johnson’s 
request for any reason.235 Balancing these interests, however, is 
not a task that should be undertaken via Turner alone.  
1. Focusing on the Outsider: Revisiting Martinez 
A court can consider revisiting Martinez to prevent 
unwarranted judicial deference to prison administrators. Like 
Martinez, the prison regulation involved inmate 
correspondence.236 Prison administrators disciplined Johnson 
by barring him from mailing his postcards.237 As the Court 
stated in Martinez, it is irrelevant that the outsider is the 
“author or intended recipient” of a correspondence.238 The First 
and Fourteenth Amendments protect both parties from 
“unjustified governmental interference with the intended 
communication.”239 Moreover, communication does not occur 
when one “writ[es] words on paper,”240 but rather when it is 
read.241 
While the communication in Martinez—a letter—is 
distinct from the artwork Johnson sent Kurtz, an argument 
can nevertheless be made as to communication. A letter 
effectively communicates when it is read, but a piece of art is 
arguably communicated when it is viewed. By denying Kurtz 
the opportunity to view a communication via artistic work, a 
prison regulation may infringe, at the very least, on his 
interest “in securing that result.”242 Moreover, if the value of 
self-determination is one held by every individual, the 
  
 234 See supra note 13 (listing the federal and states’ anti-profit legislation). 
 235 Many prison administrations cited security as a reason for a particular 
regulation. See supra Part III.A.2-3 (discussing the possible security concerns that may 
justify a regulation). 
 236 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 398-99 (1974), overruled by 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see also supra Part III.A.1. 
 237 Liptak, Prison Disciplines Publicized Inmate, supra note 9. 
 238 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408-09.  
 239 Id. at 409. 
 240 Id. at 408. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
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regulation deprives outsiders of the right to receive Johnson’s 
expression. Thus, society as a whole is deprived of what could 
potentially be the work of a gifted artist.243 
Prison administrators can argue that their choice for 
disciplining Johnson is the most rational way to punish him for 
violating the business-dealings regulation. By preventing 
Johnson from mailing his paintings, prison administrators are 
simply barring the means through which he engaged in the 
unauthorized business transaction. The argument, however, 
fails because it imposes unfairly on the rights of an outsider, 
who is not subject to the same restrictions as an inmate.244  
2. The Retaliation Factor: Abu-Jamal v. Price 
Another view the Court can adopt in Johnson’s case is 
that followed by the Third Circuit in Abu-Jamal v. Price.245 In 
1982, a jury convicted Mumia Abu-Jamal for the murder of 
Officer Danny Faulkner.246 Abu-Jamal worked as a journalist 
before his murder conviction.247 National Public Radio (“NPR”) 
interviewed him in 1994, and paid Abu-Jamal for the 
interview.248 NPR intended to air segments of the interview as 
prison-life commentaries.249 A police organization protested 
Abu-Jamal’s ability to benefit from his crime.250 In response, 
prison officials inspected Abu-Jamal’s mail and initiated an 
investigation into whether he violated the prison’s business 
rule.251 Abu-Jamal brought suit, claiming the regulation 
violated his free speech rights.252  
  
 243 Through his studio manager, abstract artist Kenneth Noland 
complimented Johnson not only for having talent, but for doing “wondrous things with 
what he’s got.” Liptak, Behind Bars, supra note 1. 
 244 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the custodial relationship between the 
state and the inmate). 
 245 Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 246 Steve Lopez, Wrong Guy, Good Cause, TIME, July 31, 2000, at 24. Officer 
Faulkner made a traffic stop on William Cook, Abu-Jamal’s brother, when Abu-Jamal 
encountered the two. He and Officer Faulkner traded gunfire. By the time police 
arrived, Abu-Jamal had been shot in the chest. Officer Faulkner succumbed to his 
injuries. Id. Abu-Jamal was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Abu-Jamal, 
154 F.3d at 130.  
 247 Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 131.  
 248 Id. 
 249 Id.  
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 130. 
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In applying Turner, the Third Circuit found that prison 
officials imposed the regulation in retaliation for the content of 
his commentaries.253 Abu-Jamal demonstrated that the 
business rule, as applied to him, was not reasonably related to 
a legitimate government interest. Contrary to Turner, prison 
officials imposed the rule based on the content of his writing.254 
There was no indication that Abu-Jamal’s writing or 
broadcasted commentaries “strained prison resources,” 
negatively impacted other prisoners, or increased danger to 
Abu-Jamal or others.255 Moreover, prison officials had an easy, 
readily available alternative in merely applying the rule in a 
content-neutral manner.256 
Johnson bears strong similarities to Abu-Jamal. 
Johnson’s activity is an exercise of expression under the First 
Amendment.257 Prison officials punished Johnson only after the 
New York Times published an article about his artwork and its 
sale to the public at a Mexican gallery.258 Like Abu-Jamal, 
prison officials argued that Johnson violated the state’s 
business-dealings rule,259 despite previously engaging in similar 
activity without objection.260 Unlike Abu-Jamal, however, the 
“content” of Johnson’s expression is not words, but art, which is 
arguably subject to individual interpretation. Thus, like Abu-
Jamal, the facts in Johnson’s case may withstand a Turner 
analysis. 
  
 253 Id. at 134. 
 254 Id. at 133. In particular, the first factor calls for the court to determine if 
the regulation is content-neutral. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Moreover, there was no 
evidence that indicated prison officials disciplined and investigated Abu-Jamal out of 
security concerns. Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 135.  
 255 Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 134. The third Turner factor considers the impact 
an accommodation of the prisoner’s right would have on prison resources, guards and 
inmates. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. No evidence suggested that Abu-Jamal’s writings 
“strained prison resources, contributed to unrest among the inmate population, or 
enhanced Jamal’s stature as a prisoner” more so than writings by other inmate-
authors. Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 134. 
 256 Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 135. The Abu-Jamal court did not address the 
second Turner factor because neither party mentioned it. Id. at 137 n.5.  
 257 See discussion on the First Amendment supra Part I.  
 258 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 259 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3024(a) (1995); see supra note 9.  
 260 Besides painting, Johnson writes for the Pelican Bay Prison Project and 
wrote his autobiography. See supra notes 222-223. Abu-Jamal continued to write 
articles while in prison. Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 131. The superintendent even 
commended Abu-Jamal for an article published in the Yale Law Journal. Id. at 131.  
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CONCLUSION 
A court’s analyses should not be limited to the Turner 
factors. Turner stands for the lowest-level of judicial review.261 
It is “categorically deferential, and does not discriminate 
among degrees of deprivation.”262 While in many cases the key 
role of prison administrators may require judicial deference,263 
cases like Johnson demand more than what Turner requires. 
Johnson is exercising his free expression right, which prison 
administrators restricted via a regulation that unfairly targets 
his expression. Not only is Johnson’s right in jeopardy, but so is 
the free expression right of outsiders.264 Moreover, Johnson’s 
punishment for his crimes—solitary confinement—already 
limits his ability to rehabilitate.265  
Under such circumstances, the Court should consider 
and balance other factors to ensure that prison administration 
decisions limit an inmate’s constitutional right only to the 
extent necessary. The balancing should include the prison 
regulation’s impact on those outside the prison.266 A court 
should give substantial weight to any infringement of an 
outsider’s First Amendment right. Moreover, the effect of a 
prison regulation, not just the purpose of enacting it, should 
play a role in judicial analysis.267  
Additionally, if a state law addresses part of the 
regulation at issue—such as an inmate’s profit-generating 
activity—courts should abstain from reviewing the issue if the 
state has not clearly spoken on it on its constitutionality. The 
business-dealings regulation potentially impinges on every 
expression made by an inmate. Son-of-Sam laws fail before the 
Court because they target speech-content.268 While a content-
neutral regulation is more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny, 
the effect of the business-dealings rule bars any exercise of 
  
 261 See discussion on Turner, supra Part III.B-C.  
 262 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  
 263 Id. at 358 (citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 
1985)). 
 264 Kurtz and the public are deprived of his artwork. 
 265 See generally Vasiliades, supra note 47 (discussing the U.S. prison system 
in the context of human rights). 
 266 See supra Part V.B.1 (suggesting that courts should include Martinez’s 
consideration of the outsider’s right in inmate constitutional challenges to prison 
regulations). 
 267 See id. 
 268 See supra Part IV for a discussion of Son-of-Sam legislation. 
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expression, and thus any potential to generate profits. The 
reality, however, is that Son-of-Sam laws are meant to do just 
that—to prevent criminals from making any profits. 
Preventing Johnson from mailing his postcards may discipline 
Johnson, but it also bars him from profiting from a creation 
that may have a “premium” simply by his notoriety, a goal that 
California unsuccessfully tried to accomplish via its previous 
Son-of-Sam laws. If the Court considered these factors—a 
prison regulation’s impact on outsiders, its prohibitive effect on 
the free expression right of inmates, and the state’s current 
anti-profit legislation—in addition to the Turner factors, it 
would reach outcomes that adequately protect the already 
limited rights of inmates. Understandably, legislatures want to 
prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes. Such a goal, 
however, should be promulgated by statute, not by uncertain 
judicial inclinations favoring deference. While it is true that 
the relatives of Johnson’s victims would not be compensated, 
the goal of Son-of-Sam laws is arguably to punish criminals 
more so than to compensate victims. Johnson is being punished 
for exercising his First Amendment right, a right that is one of 
the few he has left and one that the Court is obliged to protect. 
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